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Charles J. Iseman 
In the recent case of Michigan v. 
Mosley, 44 L. W. 4015, the United States 
Court held that the procedural require-
ments established in Miranda v. Arizona, 
384 U.S. 436, do not prescribe a second 
custodial interrogation of a criminal de-
fendant where: (1) Miranda warnings 
are properly given before each custodial 
interrogation session, (2) the defendant 
exercised his right to remain silent in the 
first session and the session was im-
mediately stopped, (3) a significant 
amount of time elapsed between the two 
sessions, (4) the defendant did not re-
quest an attorney"and (5) the crime that 
is the subject-matter of the second ses-
sion differs in nature, time and place of 
occurrence from the crime that is the 
subject-matter of the initial interrogation 
session. 
The facts of Mosley are that defendant 
Mosley was arrested for robberies, based 
upon an anomymous telephone call re-
ceived by the police, and was then inter-
rogated at the police station by the arrest-
ing officer, who gave the defendant the 
full Miranda warnings. The defendant 
told the officer that he didn't wish to 
answer any questions about the rob-
beries and the interrogation was then 
promptly terminated. Over two hours 
later, a different police officer questioned 
the defendant abot a murder and rob-
bery that were notsubjects of the first 
interrogation; full Miranda warnings 
were again given. This time, in response 
to the officer's untruthful statement that 
"Smith had confussed to participating in 
the slaying and had named [Mosley] as 
the shooter." 44 L.w. at 4016, Mosley 
implicated himself in the murder. Mosley 
was subsequently convicted for first-
degree murder at a trial in which his 
motion to suppress his incriminating 
statement was denied and in which this 
statement was admitted into evidence: 
he was then given a mandatory life sen-
tence. The Michigan Court of 'appeals 
reversed the judgement of conviction 
and held that the second interrogation 
was a per se violation of the Miranda 
requirement that interrogation cease 
upon defendant's exercise of his right to 
remain silent, 51 Mich. App. 105 214 
N. W. 2d 564. The Michigan Supreme 
Court denied further appeal, 392 Mich. 
764. The United States Supreme Court 
then granted certiorari to consider 
whether the second interrogation viol-
ated the Miranda procedure that: 
" ... If the individual indicates in any 
manner, at any time prior to or during 
questioning, that he wishes to remain si-
lent, the interrogation must cease. At this 
point he has shown that he intends to 
exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; 
any statement taken after the person in-
vokes his privilege cannot be other than 
the product of compulsion, subtle or 
otherwise. Without the right to cut off 
questioning, the setting of in-custody in-
terrogation operates on the individual to 
overcome free choice in producing a 
statement after the privilege has been 
once invoked. [Miranda v. Arizona, 384 
U.S. at 473-474]" 
. Justice Stewart's majority opinion 
examined the above passage from 






" ... To permit the continuation of cus-
todial interrogation after a momentary 
cessation would clearly frustrate the 
purposes of Miranda by allowing re-
peated rounds of questioning to under-
mine the will of the person being ques-
tioned. At the other extreme, a blanket 
prohibition against the taking of volun-
tary statements or a permanent immu-
nity from further interrogation, regardless 
of the circumstances, would transform 
the Miranda safeguards into wholly irra-
tional obstacles to legitimate police in-
vestigative activity, and deprive suspects 
of an opportunity to make informed and 
intelligent assessments of their interests. 
Clearly, therefore, neither this passage 
nor any other passage in the Miranda 
opinion can sensibly be read to create a 
per se proscription of indefinite duration 
upon any further questioning by any 
police officer on any subject, once the 
person in custody has indicated a desire 
to remain silent," 44 L. W. at 4017. 
From this examination of Miranda, Jus-
tice Stewart concluded that "[t]he criti-
cal safeguard identified in the pas-
sage at issue is a person's 'right to cut 
off questioning' " and that " ... the ad-
missibility of statements obtained after 
the person in custody has decided to 
remain silent depends under Miranda 
on whether his 'right to cut off question-
ing' was 'scrupulously honored'." 44 
L.W. at 4018. 
The Court found that the 'scrupu-
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lously honored' test was met, in the in-
stant case, from the facts that the initial 
interrogation took only about twenty 
minutes, that there was over a two hour 
period in between interrogations, that 
Miranda warnings were fully given both 
times and great care was taken both 
times to ensure that Mosley understood 
them, and that the two interrogations 
concerned different and separate factual 
occurrences. Whereas the Michigan 
Court of Appeals viewed Mosley's case 
as factually similar to Westover v. Unit-
ed States, 384 U.S. 436 (a companion 
case to Miranda), the United Staes Su-
preme Court found marked factual 
differences in that Westover involved 
prolonged, sequential interrogations with 
no significant time lapses and without 
any warnings to the arrestee. In essence, 
the Court found no overreaching by the 
state, that Mosley's statement was volun-
tarily and informedly given, and that the 
principles of Miranda were preserved. 
For these reasons, the decision of the 
Michigan Court of Appeals was reversed 
in favor of the state and the case re-
manded. 
Justice White concurred in the result, 
but would have gone further than the 
Court and would have overruled 
Miranda to the extent that the 
" .. . Miranda decision might be read to 
require interrogation to cease for some 
magical and unspecified period of time 
following an assertion of the 'right to si-
lence,' and to reject voluntariness as the 
standard by which to judge informed 
waivers of that right." 44 L. W. at 4020. 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice 
Marshall, dissented on the ground that 
" ... as to statements which are the 
product of renewed questioning, 
Miranda established a virtually irrebut-
table presumption of compul-
sion ... and that presumption stands 
strongest where, as in this case, a sus-
pect, haVing initially determined to re-
main silent, is subsequently brought to 
confess his crime. Only by adequate 
procedural safeguards could the pre-
sumption be rebutted." 44 L. W. at 
4021. Justice Brennan would find two 
altemative adequate safeguards to be a 
speedy arraignment or presence of 
counsel. He said: 
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"I do not mean to imply that counsel 
may be forced on a suspect who does 
not request an attorney. I suggest only 
that either arraignment or counsel must 
be provided before resumption of ques-
tioning to eliminate the coercive atmos-
phere of in-custody interrogation. The 
Court itself apparently proscribes resum-
ing questioning until counsel is present if 
an accused has exercised the right to 
have an attorney present at question-
ing." 44 L.W. at 4021, n.4. 
The dissent also feels that the subject-
matter of the two interrogations were re-
lated because the informer's tip for the 
arrest covered both sets of crimes, the 
homicide arose from the factual context 
of a robbery, and defendant had told the 
initial interrogator that he didn't want to 
say "[a]nything about robberies," 44 
L. W. at 4022. That is, the dissent be-
lieves the right to remain silent was 
exercised in a manner to cover the 
subject-matter of the second interroga-
tion. 
In evaluating the Mosley case, it ap-
pears to me that the subject-matter test is 
a non sequitur; i.e., that Mosley stands 
for the proposition that repeated interro-
gations are proper if (I) Miranda warn-
ings are given before each interrogation 
session, (2) there are Significant time 
lapes between sessions, (3) each session 
ceases when the defendant exercises his 
Fifth Amendment rights, and (4) the fac-
tual case-by-case context does not show 
relentless badgering of a suspect in such 
a manner as to coerce his testimory or 
undermine the voluntariness factor es-
sential to an informed and willful state-
ment. As a practical matter, strong limits 
remain upon the ability of the state to re-
peatedly custodially interrogate sus-
pects. These limits include the suspect's 
rights to continually exercise his right to 
remain silent, his right to obtain the assis-
tance of counsel at any stage of interro-
gation, and his right to a speedy hearing 
before a magistrate. Further, excessive 
pressure from the state will still result in 
the inadmissibility of inciminating 
statements. The net effect of Mosley still 
leaves the public interests in police inves-
tigative work in balance with the con-





by Lindsay Schlottman 
In an action brought under 42 U.s.c. 
sec. 1983, the Supreme Court, led by 
Justice Rehnquist, reversed a federal dis-
trict court's attempt to end a pattern of il-
legal and unconstitutional police mis-
treatment of citizens. Rizzo v. Goode, 44 
LW 4095, was decided on January 21; 
1976 and is the resting spot for litigation 
which lasted six years. 
Rizzo began as two separate actions 
(Goode v. Rizzo and COPPAR v. Tate), 
each commencing in 1970, in which the 
principal defendants were the officials 
occupying the offices of Mayor, City 
Managing Director (who supervises and, 
with the Mayor's approval, appoints the 
Police Commissioner) and Police 
Commissioner (who has direct supervis-
ory power over the police department). 
The two suits, permitted to proceed as 
class actions, alleged a pervasive pattern 
of illegal and unconstitutional police mis-
treatment, of minority citizens particu-
larly, and of Philadelphia residents gen-
erally. The defendants were charged 
with conduct ranging from express au-
thorization or encouragement of police 
misconduct to failure to act in a manner 
which would assure that such miscon-
duct would not occur in the future. 
Before the District Court for the East-
ern District of Pennsylvania, forty-odd 
incidents of alleged police misconduct 
were revealed. Hearings lasted twenty-
one days and two hundred and fifty wit-
nesses testified, resulting in findings of 
fact which both sides accepted with re-
spect to thirty-six incidents. {The inci-
